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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS area of responsibility (AOR), CENTCOM officially notified EUCOM that they were opening the front and required their support for the movement and sustainment of combat forces there. Due to the Government of Turkey's (GOT's) reluctance to allow coalition ground forces to transit through their country, the majority of the operations in the Northern Front were abandoned. 4 However, had the GOT approved ground movement, it is questionable if EUCOM's forces were organized suitably to perform the mission. This paper will explore the adequacy of the organization of the Northern Front and provide possible remedies for the future.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Soon after CENTCOM approved the two front operation into Iraq, cracks in command and control systems developed causing a lack of unity of effort with regard to the Northern Front.
This lack of unity of effort was a result of a continually changing command structure, competing missions, and a lack of expertise with the operational and strategic military arts within the assigned headquarters.
SEAMS BETWEEN REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS
"Unity of command is the interlocking web of responsibility which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally." Command (TRANSCOM) as supporting commands. 7 The Northern Front fell on the boundary between CENTCOM and EUCOM regions. At this boundary, Turkey is in EUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR), and Iraq is in CENTCOM's. 8 Consequently, the question of whom has operational control (OPCON) for troop units operating On the other hand, CENTCOM had a problem of its own in the North. They had insufficient forces to protect the lines of communications (LOCs) of 4 th Infantry Division (4 th ID)
as they advanced south into Iraq. This area behind 4 th ID was labeled 'The Void' and promoted great discussion on how to ensure the viability of the division's rear area. 10 Given this predicament, EUCOM favored being assigned control of the area behind the 4 th ID to follow them in order to protect their rear area. EUCOM preferred this course of action because they retained control of its forces, providing them more flexibility within their entire AOR.
While both arguments were feasible, neither command was willing to give up control of land or forces in their assigned AOR. Consequently, a sub-optimal command structure was adopted between CENTCOM and the theater forces in Turkey with EUCOM, serving as an intermediary. This complicated command and control for the forces on the ground and hindered achieving the maximum unity of effort.
CHANGING LEADERSHIP AT THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL.
From the outset, the entire process of planning and deploying a force into Turkey was hamstrung by a constantly rotating and often-unqualified series of EUCOM staff members sent into Turkey to support the U.S. State Department personnel with negotiations. Specifically, EUCOM's joint planning group (JPG) was tasked with planning the operation, yet EUCOM sent logistic operators from the Directorate of Logistics (J4) staff section to conduct the negotiations.
Because the J4 section was not intimate with the requirements, limitations, constraints, and reasoning for the activities of the operation, these negotiators were ill-prepared to achieve a satisfactory agreement with the GOT.
This problem was further exacerbated when the J4 included rotating representatives from the service components who were not completely aware of arrangements made during previous negotiations. This led to a very disjointed presentation of requirements and concessions with the GOT and severely slowed the entire process. Turkey. 24 While the concept was valid, the timing, resourcing, and location of JTF-North were flawed -and continued to circumvent achieving unity of effort in the theater.
With the 4 th ID's equipment loaded on ships and the Air Force and Army force structures already moving into Turkey, it was clear that JTF-North was a good idea that was executed too late to make a difference. 25 It was created after plans were written by other subordinate organizations, and command relationships already cemented. Further hamstringing this organization was an inadequate manning of their headquarters. It consisted of only 68 officers and NCOs taken from across EUCOM's region. With the exception of the commander, LTG Broadwater, the staff was well below the grade necessary to work at the highest levels of government with the host nation. Furthermore, none of the staff had previously worked together in their current roles. Factor in that they had no assigned equipment and you have a recipe for an ineffective organization, at least for the first few months.
JTF-North's headquarters was set up in the U.S. Military Mission to Turkey headquarters in Ankara. 26 This positioning proved both good and bad. On the good side, it allowed LTG Broadwater and his staff to work directly with the senior governmental and military leadership of Turkey. This interaction was critical at the time of their arrival, for two reasons. First the US government was still negotiating with the GOT for entrance into the country and allowed the JTF-N commander and staff to facilitate this process. Second, it finally stabilized the staff that interacted with the GOT. This was important to cement relationships with the Turkish leadership. On the down side, however, the JTF-N commander's large distance from his subordinate units made C2 extremely difficult, especially given that his headquarters had little in regards to communications equipment.
To further complicate the matter, USAREUR non-doctrinally retained the ARFOR-T in an OPCON status while simultaneously assigning it to JTF-N in a TACON status. 27 In essence, ARFOR-T served two masters.
During the three months that JTF-North existed, they quite literally never attempted to command or control their fielded forces. There were never any regularly scheduled meetings or 28 While they too have a hierarchical command structure, their focus is diffused, with a good portion of it going laterally and up. This lateral and upward focus allows organizational level units to negotiate between peer and senior level organizations to achieve consensus on resourcing and support. Therefore, in order to be effective, the leadership in organizational level units must have a sound understanding of how these outside organizations operate as well as be skilled practitioners of the crafts their tactical subordinates perform.
When planning began for opening the Northern Front, the staff and leadership of the1 st ID, a tactical organization, did not possess the necessary skills to function effectively in the operational realm. And with just two months between notification and execution of the ARFOR's mission they had insufficient time to thoroughly train these skills. While their skills grew rapidly during planning and upon deployment, their inexperience significantly limited their ability to perform well and most certainly hamstrung their best efforts to synchronize activities across the theater.
A second pitfall of requiring a military organization to step up into the role of a higher level headquarters is that of being required to act as a superior to what were previously peer level units. The friction that can develop comes in three forms. First, the peer commanders are often in competition professionally with each other. This competition can lead to an undercurrent of detrimental actions designed to undercut the new leader's authority. The second is reluctance on the part of the assigned leader to fully exercise his new authorities because he recognizes that at the conclusion of their mission, he will once again be operating on a peer level. Third, the new subordinate commands are familiar and comfortable with their previous command relationships. Therefore, they can find themselves gravitating back to those familiar relationships to conduct their work. In this instance, the newly appointed command authority can find actions pertaining to his new command processed without his knowledge or concurrence.
Such was the predicament the 1 st ID found itself in when appointed the ARFOR for This often left the commander of the ARFOR-T out of the decision loop. 31 The last point of friction that challenged the 1 st ID's ability to plan, and deploy the ARFOR-T was that they did not have formal authority over any of the 'to be assigned' units until a 
PLANNING DIFFICULTIES
Together with the changing command structures, disjointed planning across the various headquarters threatened mission success. Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint
Operations, prescribes two planning processes at the combatant command level. The first is the Deliberate Planning Process, which as its name implies, is very methodical and is designed to take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The other process has the moniker of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) and is structured to take any where from 1 day to 18 months. 33 While CENTCOM had conducted deliberate planning to enter Iraq through Turkey, the supporting combatant command, in this case EUCOM, conducted Crisis Action Planning (CAP) to plan the supporting efforts.
JP 5.0 highlights that CAP is best facilitated by parallel planning between the supported and supporting headquarters. 34 FM3-93 further highlights that it is beneficial if subordinate and supporting commands send representatives to the higher headquarters' CAP process in order to facilitate parallel planning. 35 For OIF the benefits of parallel planning were undermined on two levels. First, the fact that EUCOM had to undertake the CAP process at all was unnecessary.
Had While EUCOM and USAREUR continually drafted numerous versions of orders and planning messages, they remained in draft form and were only made available to subordinate commands through personal planner-to-planner relationships. Emails, and phone calls between planners were instrumental in achieving a satisfactory level of synchronization between commands given the bottom up planning approach that was used. For the 1 st ID, their OPORD was as close to a guess as they could achieve using doctrinal publications and leveraging newly forged planner relationships with higher headquarters. Had CENTCOM, EUCOM, and USAREUR incorporated the ARFOR into their planning process from the outset this process could have been streamlined. Furthermore, had a habitual theater level organization assumed the ARFOR role, planning relationships could have been cemented sooner.
Complicating the planning process further was the management of the number of U.S.
forces to be allowed into Turkey. This was a problem for military planners as the State Department negotiated force levels with seemingly little regard for military requirements and never finalized. 39 This caused the ARFOR-T to worse case all planning resource estimates to minimize risk of mission failure. Additionally, the doctrinal unit deployment scheduling process (Time Phased Force Deployment Data -TPFDD development process) was circumvented by the Secretary of Defense, as he wanted to personally approve troop movements down to detachment level. 40 Ultimately, because the timeline to put the ARFOR-T mission together was short and murky due to failures to adequately conduct parallel planning between strategic and operational levels of command, the GOT's reluctance to approve troop movements, and a circumvented unit deployment process, the planning process was problematic at best. 43 It is useful to analyze the ultimate design of the ARFOR-T organization using these elements to determine whether the organization would have been capable of performing their mission in Turkey.
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (C4ISR).
The use of a tactical Division headquarters, as an ARFOR headquarters is not unprecedented as the 10th Mountain Division did it twice recently in Somalia and Afghanistan. 44, 45 But as is discussed in FM 3-91 Division Operations, "When this is done, the Division requires a significant amount of personnel and equipment augmentation to do the job." suggests that more personnel were required to manage the administrative and logistic requirements. The differences between operating at the operational vice tactical level are very significant and require an expertise in resourcing, logistics, and peer-negotiation with other services, nations, and commands to work through issues. 47 With regard to the 1 st ID's ability to form an ARFOR headquarters, they were hampered because a third of their division staff was serving in Kosovo with Operation Joint Guardian, and another third was preparing to replace them on 26 November 2002. 48 To achieve the functionality required to operate as an operational level headquarters, 1 st ID requested staff augmentation. 49 Unfortunately, by the time the ARFOR-T deployed, the staff augmentation was only partial. It included BG Pillsbury to serve to serve as the G4, American
Red Cross, MWR, theater engineers, and personnel support. It deployed having no additional support for the G2, G3, or G5. Ultimately, the 1 st ID attempted to fill many empty billets by stripping its brigade and separate battalions to the absolute minimum. Once done, the portion of the division that remained in Central Region was only capable of minimum sustainment operations, thereby rendering it combat ineffective. Even with augmentation, the Division staff still had to overcome a significant training and experience level to move from operating at the tactical level of war to moving to the operational and strategic. Given these staff shortcomings it is difficult to imagine the Division being capable of sustained, high-tempo operations. World Wide Web access via satellite at key nodes across southern Turkey. 52 Additionally, it was prepared to support the 4 th ID with signal support into Iraq. This architecture was sufficient but fragile. But because there were no extra satellite communications packages, when any system failed the command was forced to dramatically reduce the number of users for days at a time until they could be repaired.
COMMUNICATIONS
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Further complicating the use of satellite communications was that there was no satisfactory means for supporting communications of moving units. Because short-range tactical radios were near useless, except within convoy serials, the ARFOR-T was forced to depend on secure and non-secure cell phone communications while on the move. 54 Naturally, the temptation to conduct secure business over the non-secure phones was a significant operational security (OPSEC) risk.
The last communications resourcing challenge dealt with communicating with the host nation government of Turkey. The Turkish Military possessed very little secure communications capability, and most senior leaders did not have access to it. Consequently, the ARFOR-T traded liaisons with them and relied on face-to-face communications and couriers.
While theater-level communications were adequate for the ARFOR-T mission, the lack of portable secure communications equipment promised to degrade operations on the Northern
Front as it did on the Southern Front during OIF. 55 The communication's shortcomings encountered by the ARFOR-T highlighted the need to invest in a more capable long range, mobile, and secure communications systems for theater level use.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
The nature of the critical intelligence mission in Turkey was difficult because the U.S. was working within a sovereign nation that would not tolerate an intrusion into their internal affairs.
With this constraint, the U.S. forces were limited to using national intelligence sources almost operating. Radical Hizbollah factions were also resident in this area and a threat to an US presence in the region. Of further threat significance was that the majority of U.S. military activity would occur within ten miles of the Syrian border. The Syrian government was known to support terrorism against U.S. interests, and was opposed to OIF. The last significant threat came from Iraq itself. The western sector of the Turkish Theater was within ballistic missile range of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operatives were known to be operating throughout southern Turkey. 56 These threats, coupled with the fact that US equipment and personnel were operating in the congested ports, cities, and along a limited number of LOCs required the ARFOR-T to implement significant force protection measures. for all of the other nodes and bases was to be provided by the soldiers of the units that were performing logistic functions there. Here is where another crack developed. Because the numbers of soldiers working at these nodes was small, it required virtually every soldier to be performing his or her logistic task with little or no time left to perform security missionsessentially the nodes would have been undermanned. 58 This under-manning of security forces is due in a large part, especially early in the operation, to the programmed late arrival of the Reserve Component (RC) logistic forces.
Law Enforcement.
The 95 th Military Police (MP) Battalion was designated to assume the law enforcement role. 59 This battalion is habitually assigned to the 21 st TSC. 60 It is a multi-composition unit that had half of its companies in the active component (AC), and half in the RC. The 95 th MP Battalion was only able to deploy the two active component companies. Their third company (a reserve component unit) was not scheduled to arrive until late in the force flow. 61 Due to their small force size, the 95 th MP Battalions primary role was limited to working with the Turkish Jandarme in support of traffic control, and performing other law enforcement functions prescribed by the commander of the ARFOR-T.
Engineering.
Engineering functions for opening a theater are a bit different than most in the Army expect to see. Engineers at the theater level focus more on the development of infrastructure than on traditional mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability engineering missions.
Specifically, they manage the acquisition and lease of all real estate, coordinate and supervise all construction contracts, and build facilities. 62 For the mission in Turkey, the USAREUR's newly formed theater engineer brigade, the 18 th Engineer (EN) Brigade (BDE) was attached to the ARFOR-T. 63 This was a very beneficial assignment, as this headquarters brought with it the expertise to conduct the contracting for all leased properties in Turkey -for which there were many.
To support the improvement of the infrastructure, a naval Civil Engineer Battalion (CB) was attached to the 18 th EN BDE for the first 30 days of the mission. This battalion, together with civilian engineering contract support provided just enough capability to prepare only the most essential facilities for the theater. Specifically, they were capable of building the fuel storage area, portions of the ammunition storage area, and improving some entrances and supply routes through the 4 th ID's planned assembly area. Unfortunately, the lack of time, engineer manpower, and equipment prohibited any attempt at completely preparing the tactical assembly area for the 4 th ID. This lack of preparation work carried great risk, as there was a significant possibility that the 4 th ID could get mired in mud in the unprepared area -a lesson recently learned in Kosovo and Albania.
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Air Space and Missile Defense.
Air missile defense was a shortcoming from the beginning of the operation. At the point when the decision was made to open the northern front into Iraq, all of the U.S. Patriot battalions were already assigned to defend units in Iraq, Israel, and Korea. In the EUCOM area of responsibility there were two batteries of Patriot available, but no battalion command and control structure to plug into to provide conductivity to the combined air operating picture. 65 To further complicate matters, the Turkish GOT had not authorized the conduct of combat operations in Turkey which prohibited the use of Patriot systems.
In terms of air defense, however, the GOT was eager to have theater ballistic missile air defense over critical infrastructure on the chance that the Iraqis would launch a missile in their direction. As a compromise, the U.S. government agreed to position to two remaining Patriot batteries in Turkey under the heading of 'NATO' support to an ally. Therefore, these systems were allowed to enter the country under standard military agreements pertaining to NATO members. 66 Once this diplomatic process was approved and the systems moved to Turkey, combat operations in Iraq were nearly complete. For this mission, these units were only under administrative control (ADCON) for sustainment and force protection to the ARFOR-T. This occurred for two reasons. First the IO staff section of the G3 was minimally manned with only two very inexperienced staff personnel. The ability of this staff to produce meaningful work was further minimized by a lack of guidance from USAREUR and EUCOM in this area.
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Consequently, the ARFOR-T staff was rather impotent with regard to any ability to plan and monitor IO operations. Secondly, civil affairs (CA) and physiological operations (PSYOP) units
were not made available to support information operations.
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Of the shortcomings associated with this mission in Turkey, the failure of conducting an effective IO campaign with regard to the war was particularly stinging. It can only be speculated at this point, had an IO campaign focused on acquiring the support of the Turkish population for the mission in Iraq been developed and implemented, the Northern Front may have been opened for the 4 th ID and the length of the war shortened, thus saving lives.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) DEFENSE
NBC defense was another area where significant risk was accepted. Again, mission analysis identified and validated the requirement for a Chemical Brigade with at least two duel purpose reconnaissance and decontamination battalions. In this case, only one RC battalion could be identified and it would take over 90 days to deploy into theater. 71 In short, the ARFOR-T deployed with only the 1 st ID's organic chemical company. 72 The ability of this small NBC asset to provide adequate defense across a 900km wide theater where the potential of missile attacks using chemical warheads and biological contamination by terrorists existed was extremely doubtful.
Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC)
Army doctrine further prescribes that at within the ARFOR-T Headquarters that a RC While these RC component soldiers of the 313 th ROC were trained in their specialty, they were few in number, were not present during the planning of the operation, and were not familiar with working at the operation level of war. Consequently they were only marginally effective upon their arrival in Turkey. To keep the C2 for force protection from failing, the 1 st ID quickly augmented the ROC using the original mission planners. 74 The late arrival of RC personnel to the operation caused AC augmentation to support what was considered a RC mission. This AC augmentation came at a great expense to other on going missions.
SUSTAINMENT FORCES
Theater Support Commands (TSC) were designed to provide the ASCC, and subsequently, the Combatant Commander, the backbone of their sustainment support. The preponderance of the theater transportation, ammunition, petroleum, and medical units are in these reserve component elements. 75 These logistics based organizations are often the first to deploy in order to support opening the theater. were needed to open the northern front.
• Perform heavy equipment transport to move armored vehicles (240 HETs for 820 total single lifts) • Deliver up to 800,000 gallons of fuel each day
• Provide cargo trucks and trailers to move thousands of short tons of supplies each day and over 3,000 equipment containers for the 4 th ID.
• Build Ammunition storage areas to receive and store 1,781 containers of ammunition.
• Perform Level III Medical care (Essentially establish a Combat Support Hospital (CSH)) • Conduct movement control and out of the theater.
• Perform theater level maintenance.
• Perform aerial medical evacuation.
• Conduct force protection within their logistic nodes 79 This logistic mission was to be sustained over a 900 km LOC in Turkey and then an over 
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theater-opening functions is ineffective and that the mission over-stretch for the TSC is real and must be managed closely.
SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The lessons learned from the attempt to open the OIF's Northern Front identify the need for a change in the Army's operational level organizations that will be required to rapidly open a theater. Three organizational changes need to be executed to meet the challenges of global rapid military action.
In order to correct the command and control shortcomings caused by throwing together ad hoc organizations, the Army should always use established operational headquarters. An ASCC typically has three standing organizations that could possibly fill the role. The first is a TSC headquarters. The TSC could be used in special situations where the focus of the operation was mostly towards logistics. In particular, they would be effective in support of humanitarian assistance operations, and some theater opening missions. The TSC is not the most versatile unit in the operational C2 role because they lack expertise with regard to maneuver, and other non-logistic planning functions.
The second organization often resident in an ACSS is an Army Corps headquarters. This unit is designed to plan and conduct operations at both the tactical and operational level, making it an ideal unit to fulfill the deployable theater role. The only issue with using a Corps headquarters, is that there are only four in the U.S. Army, and their use is tied to one or more operations plans national (OPLANs). This makes their availability problematic.
The last standing organization that can perform as a deployable operational headquarters is the ASCC itself. For example, CENTCOM's ASCC, 3 rd Army performed this role during OIF.
But with the complexity of today's environment, the ASCC is more times than not, involved in more than one major operation, making their ability to deploy and focus appropriately on a single mission questionable. This leaves a fourth alternative, create a standing operational level Army headquarters or Task Force (SATF). This headquarters would directly support DoD's concept for creating Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters in each Regional Component Commander's area of responsibility. 83 The term 'standing' implies the need for the headquarters to be equipped, manned and trained to deploy to a remote location and immediately operate. With these attributes the unit would avoid JTF-N's problem of being incapable of providing command and control for the first 90 days they existed.
To be extremely effective, the SATF would need to have a habitual relationship with the Regional Combatant Command (RCC) staff. Currently, the ASCC itself is the only Army organization that has this kind of relationship with its RCC. In order for the SATF to achieve the same level of interaction with the RCC as the ASCC enjoys, it would be practical for the SATF to be a detachable and deployable component of the ASCC headquarters. For example, the detachable SATF could have as its commander the deputy ASCC commander. Additionally, each staff section would have a deployable section that would man the SATF. Lastly, the planning cell of the ASCC responsible for the SATF mission would deploy with the SATF. With this relationship, the SATF will be able to conduct focused, parallel planning with the RCC's staff, ensuring completely synchronized resourcing, and eliminate ad hocery. The figure below illustrates the design of this organization.
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COMBATANT COMMAND • All forces and equipment necessary to open a theater must be immediately deployable --this could require that only active component units perform this role.
SJTF
• Get closer to the area of crisis. The closer the TSC's equipment is to the crisis, the more rapidly it can react. To achieve this goal extra sets of unit equipment could be placed on Army Preposition Ships (APS), stored in strategically placed pre-positioning warehouses around the globe, or positioned at ports of embarkation within CONUS.
This would facilitate rapid movement and subsequent arrival.
• Remove the burden of home-station logistic support. This rearward focus forces the TSCs to split assets and unduly limits their ability to support a crisis operation.
With the TSC fixed, the last recommended organizational structural change is to create a standing task force of enabler organizations. This functional command should include medical, NBC, communications, engineering, law enforcement, and command and control units. By not tying this command to a specific logistic or tactical maneuver organization, allows it to be functional rather than specifically organized for a single type of mission. This unit would be more able to rapidly support multiple forms of crisis. An enabler task force would further be ideal to support internal homeland defense and disaster relief. Essentially the units depicted in figure 9 are critical to nearly every type of operation from combat to humanitarian assistance.
They are rarely, if ever, used separately. Their habitual association with one another would make their interoperability immediate when called. 
CONCLUSION
Due to decisions by the Government of Turkey, the ARFOR-T was unable to complete the opening of ground route through Turkey into the Northern Front for OIF. Therefore, we can only speculate as to the ultimate success of this operation. The effort in Turkey was extremely valuable for the U.S. Army and the U.S. military as a whole because it clearly identified cracks in our command and control structures, and gaps in our ability to rapidly support theater opening and sustainment operations. Armed with these lessons and many others from OIF, the Department of Defense is prepared to take the next step in transformation and perhaps create standing, functional organizations whose habitual relationships facilitate immediate, synchronized, and effective response. But to the credit of all the ARFOR-T, they whole-heartedly embraced their responsibilities and used every opportunity to plan, train, and execute this mission -overall an amazing accomplishment.
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